

STRATEGIC PLAN

2014-2019

Commission for the
Investigation of Abuse
of Authority (CIAA),
Nepal



**Institutional Strategy of the Commission for
the Investigation of Abuse of Authority
(2014-2019)**

Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority

Tangal, Kathmandu

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FOREWORD

The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) is very much pleased to bring its Institutional Strategy encompassing the upcoming six years (2014-2019). This is regarded as a roadmap for the Commission to initiate its activities for preventing and prosecuting corruption. This is also a driving tool to accomplish the task of curbing corruption so that it will contribute for good governance.

CIAA had to function without Chief Commissioner (2006-2013) and Commissioners (2010-2013) for a long period of time. This not only created uncertainties on the coordination for anti-corruption movement but also impeded the proactive role of the Commission for anti-corruption endeavours. After the assumption of office by the new leadership in May 2013, it is now the appropriate time to draft new institutional strategy incorporating the aspirations, vision and goals of the new leadership.

Corruption is a pernicious disease adversely affecting all aspects of our development. We, at CIAA, fundamentally, believe that Nepal has remained poor due to corruption and not the other way round. It will be fallacious to assume that the country is corrupt because it is poor; it is the corruption that is making us poor. Corruption has become a pervasive disease and it is almost impossible to cure it without a strategic move. But at the same time, we also have to be aware enough that formulating a strategy is only a direction to precede not a complete drive. What counts are not the content of the strategy but its effective implementation and the result it brings.

Over the last decade or so, the dimensions of corruption have undergone dramatic change in Nepal. So have been its trends, intensity and complexity. It is no more an individual aberration that can be cured by plucking a couple of rotten apples from the crate. We have to accept the fact that corruption has been gradually and perniciously institutionalized in Nepal which has actually been difficult to trace out in preliminary attempts. This is the challenge and a paradox confronting every one of us. As there are evidences of corruption growing in its complexity and intensity in Nepal, we need a different strategy to deal with this situation. And let me make it clear at the outset that CIAA alone can do only a little. At a time when corruption related crimes are very organized, little can be expected when agencies designed to fight corruption remain disorganized and dysfunctional. CIAA looks forward to this rationalized collaborative leadership role. We need a new vision and a new thinking on fighting corruption in Nepal. While embarking on a journey, it

is more important to have a clear vision and thinking than knowledge about the destination.

Let there be no confusion that CIAA is a constitutional independent body designed to fight public sector corruption in Nepal. We have to come out of this partial, parochial public sector orientation on corruption and need to think beyond public sector perspective.

In the absence of clear and concise political will and commitment to fight corruption, there is limited strategic maneuvering. Though it is tough to accomplish, however it is not impossible altogether. We have to accept that it is high time to work with coordination and collaboration. We have realized that Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) is to be assigned to take a leading role and responsibility to coordinate for national anti-corruption policies and practices. Again, let me assert myself that the objectivity and success of investigation and prosecution of corruption largely depends on our internal capacities to go through the complexity of the cases and our penetrating capacity to corruption-prone areas. The present strategy has been conceived basically with this in mind. Let me assert again that our success should be reflected in the implementation of this strategy. We need commitment, solidarity and accomplishment so that we will be able to approach our destination. And, at the same time, I am assured that we are committed to implement this strategy to achieve our goals.

At this juncture, I express my gratitude to UNDP for supporting us to draft this strategy. Likewise, I would like to thank for other stakeholders for their valuable contributions to prepare this strategy. I would also like to thank my colleagues within CIAA, including Planning Division, for their valuable inputs and for charting out this institutional strategy.

Thanking everybody.

Lok Maan Singh Karki
Chief Commissioner
Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) drafted its first strategic plan in 2002 which was designed as a five year plan (2002-2006). In 2006, a second strategic plan was drafted as a three year plan (2006-2008). Since then the CIAA has been working without any strategic plans whatsoever. With the appointment of the new leadership in May 2013, there is now an imperative need within the CIAA to have a strategic rethinking. Meanwhile, Nepal's transitional situation has also created a demand for re-orientation of the CIAA to fight corruption. This institutional strategy for the CIAA has been drawn with a long term vision of six years (2014-2019) divided into two phases of three years each. Broadly, the strategic plan document seeks to answer four questions: (1) where the CIAA has come from (2) where it is at the moment (3) where it is going from here, and (4) how it is going to get there. Part A of this document seeks to answer first two questions, while Part B will answer the remaining two.

Since its establishment in 1990/91, CIAA has passed through three major phases. With the appointment of the new leadership, the CIAA is now at a fourth phase of operation. The analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) to the CIAA boils down to seven critical issues that need to be resolved when designing a new institutional strategy. These seven critical issues include: (1) determining the mandate of the CIAA, (2) resolving the issue of flexible vs. stable staff members, (3) designing appropriate performance incentives and security for staff members, (4) organizational restructuring, (5) institutional capacity development, (6) international collaboration and cooperation, and (7) installing a performance based monitoring system.

To achieve the vision, mission, and goals of the CIAA, six strategies are suggested. These include three core strategies: punitive measures, prevention, and education, and three supporting strategies: institutional capacity development, internal coordination and collaboration, and building external linkages.

The crux of this institutional strategy is that CIAA is primarily an anti-corruption law enforcement agency in Nepal. All activities of CIAA should be directed to this end. The CIAA should regain and restore public trust and confidence through credible law enforcement activities. The enforcement of anti-corruption laws should be the immediate and priority concerns. Preventive and promotional activities should be of medium and long term concerns. However, CIAA needs to immediately dispel the general apprehensions and distrust that exist among some political quarters through effective education and promotional activities.

The CIAA should exhibit itself as an organization of high integrity, and this calls for financial and operational independence, strengthened research and data analysis, performance-based organization, there by becoming a leading agency to fight corruption in Nepal.

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Acronym

AC	Anti-Corruption
ACA	Anti-Corruption Agency
CA	Constituent Assembly
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CoC	Control of Corruption
CIAA	Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
DAMLI	Department of Anti-Money Laundering and Investigation
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DfID	Department for International Development
GCB	Global Corruption Barometer
GII	Global Integrity Index
GoN	Government of Nepal
ICAC	Independent Commission for Anti-Corruption, Hong Kong
KPK	Corruption Eradication Commission, Indonesia
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NID	National Intelligence Department
NVC	National Vigilance Centre
OPMCM	Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers
MACC	Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
PSC	Public Service Commission
RID	Revenue Intelligence Department
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats
TI	Transparency International
UNCAC	United Nation Convention Against Corruption
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION

One of the preconditions for managing a successful anti-corruption agency (ACA) is to have a coherent and holistic strategy that focuses on prevention, detection, and investigation of corruption and the education and awareness raising programs against it (UNDP, 2005). Having a strategy may not guarantee ACA success, but not having one makes it vulnerable to failures akin to the saying: *failing to plan is planning to fail*.

After remaining vacant for more than six years (October 2006-May 2013), the Government of Nepal finally appointed the Chief Commissioner and the Commissioner of the CIAA. With this new leadership, it is time for the CIAA to draw up an institutional strategy incorporating the goals and aspirations of the new leadership in conjunction with the government's anti-corruption agenda. The successive governments in 2009, 2010, and 2012 have outlined anti-corruption strategies and action plans, institution wise anti-corruption work plans, a national anti-corruption strategy and work plans to implement the UNCAC provisions. The last strategy and work plan was drafted in July 2012 and designed to meet the UNCAC requirements which were ratified in February 2011. All of these strategies and work plans have outlined specific roles and responsibilities of the CIAA.

The high-profile actions by the CIAA in July and August 2013 have rejuvenated the people's expectations of Nepal's anti-corruption drive which had fallen due to the prolonged absence of leadership within the CIAA. People are increasingly looking towards the CIAA to do something about this pernicious disease. From mid September 2013, CIAA also decentralized its operations with the establishment of five regional offices. A proposal is currently underway to establish a similar number of sub-regional (liaison) offices, and some of them are already established. With regional outreach, there will be a tremendous increase in the CIAA activities and responsibilities. By the result of its organizational expansion, CIAA will soon have a doubling of human resources. This, too, in turn poses new management challenges.

The Commission drafted its first institutional strategic plan in 2002. This was for five years (2002-2006) and was drafted at a time when the CIAA was at its most assertive period since its establishment in 1990. Bilateral donors could be seen extending support to the CIAA. However, political developments in 2005 put a setback and some constraints especially on collaboration among international supporting partners. Some pulled their support midway into projects, affecting the implementation of the strategic plan. The CIAA drafted a second strategic

plan in 2006, this time for three years (2006-2008) in line with the government's Three Years Interim Plan. Since the termination of this second strategic plan, CIAA has been operating without a long-term strategic plan. With the start of the 13th National Development Plan (2013-2015), CIAA is contemplating the drafting of a third strategic plan. This document is prepared as that strategic plan covering the vision and objectives of the 13th periodic plan as well as a longer term vision of six years to match the tenure of the new leadership.

Some clarification is required here on understanding the institutional strategy of the CIAA. Readers may get confused with the publication of anti-corruption strategies, work plans, and action plans prepared by the government in 2009, 2010 and 2012. Unlike many other countries where a leading responsibility to draft, implement or monitor and evaluate national anti-corruption strategies are normally taken by ACA, in the case of Nepal this responsibility has been taken up by the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers (OPMCM). This situation has occurred primarily because CIAA remained without leadership for such a long period of time (October 2006-May 2013). In all these strategies and work plans, the GoN has made CIAA the primary agency to implement various components of the national anti-corruption strategies and work plans. Out of 105 listed activities in the institution-wise national anti-corruption strategies and work plans of 2012, 34 activities (around one-third) have been planned to be implemented by the CIAA. This institutional strategy of the CIAA should not be confused with national anti-corruption strategies, policies, and action plans of the government. However, this document has been prepared taking into consideration the roles and responsibilities mentioned by the GoN in its various policy documents.

Clarification is also required here to differentiate the institutional strategy of CIAA and the institutional or capacity development strategy of it. The latter can be regarded as a sub-component of overall institutional strategy. With a view to support the CIAA for a longer term, UNDP is preparing a project document for technical assistance.

This report is structured into two parts. It begins with a situational analysis of CIAA. This is divided into several sections. First, there is an assessment of the corruption situation in Nepal. Second, a brief sketch is provided on the role of CIAA in fighting corruption in Nepal. And third, the results of SWOT analysis and stakeholder analysis of CIAA are presented. Information for these analyses is collected from a series of discussions and interaction with the leadership and the concerned officials of the Commission. At the end, key strategic issues of the CIAA are given. These are taken as the key building blocks for drafting this institutional strategy.

In the second part, we propose a new institutional strategy for CIAA coinciding with the tenure of the new leadership. This part includes outlining vision, mission, goals, and strategies. Broadly, three core strategies and three supporting strategies are proposed. The strategic plan matrix outlines issues, challenges, and objectives behind each strategy and possible indicators to measure achievement of the strategy.

The main elements that make this institutional strategy are summarized at the end of this report under the section entitled “final remarks and conclusions”. Factual data and information collected for this report is presented at the end.

Part A: Situational Assessment of the CIAA

1. General Assessment of Corruption Situation

There is very little local data measuring corruption in Nepal. What is available is either too scant or outdated. However, there is a rich source of global data on corruption measurement. Two indicators, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International and the Control of Corruption (CoC) by the World Bank are used here to highlight the corruption situation in Nepal (panel a and b). Saving the latest data on CPI in 2013, both indicators speak of deterioration in the perception of corruption. This is reflected by a declining trend line. The CPI data for Nepal is available from 2004 onwards. Except in 2013, Nepal had scored less than 3. As per Transparency International, the countries scoring less than 3 are regarded as “corruption rampant countries”. CoC data is available from 1996 onwards. In Graph (b) some marked improvement can be observed in 2002 and 2003. This could be due to high profile actions taken in 2002.

Another important source of data on corruption is Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) Survey organized by TI. Unlike the CPI, which is based on the opinions of the experts, the GCB Survey asks common people about their perceptions, experiences, and feelings regarding their day to day experience with corruption. So far, Nepal featured twice in the surveys organized in 2011 and 2013. In 2011, the total percentage of respondents saying “corruption increased a lot in Nepal” was 62.8 percent. This figure jumped to 72 percent in 2013. The GCB survey for Nepal also revealed political parties (90%) as highly corrupt institutions in Nepal, followed by public officials (85%), police (80%), and parliament (79%). Based on daily bribery experience of the people, other corrupt institutions in Nepal included customs, land revenue, judiciary, and tax revenue (refer to table 1).

Instead of directly measuring corruption problems of a country, another roundabout way to measure corruption is to measure the existence of anti-corruption frameworks or safeguard measures that exist within it. The Global Integrity Index (GII) is one such measure. GII scores for Nepal are available from 2006-2009. In 2006, Nepal was rated as “a very weak” country (Refer to Table 1). Though some marginal improvement can be seen, Nepal is still rated as a “weak” country.

Corruption is not a new problem in Nepal. It is rooted in Nepal's history. However, during different regimes, the form, structure, intensity, and density of corruption underwent significant changes. During the *Rana regime* (1847-1951), corruption was basically extractive. During the monarchy led party-less *Panchayat system* (1960-1990) it was distributive – that is, it was more about distribution of state resources to buy opponents and keep the supporters happy. During the parliamentary democratic system (1990-2006) corruption was democratized and decentralized. If political stability during monarchy (1960-1990) facilitated corruption in Nepal; political instability

during multi-party regime (1990-2006) encouraged corruption. The current transition period reflects further anomalies. With the regime change, the corruption by earlier elites has been replaced with a new set of elites. Due to a weak state resulting from a decade long internal conflict and prolonged political transition, the opportunities for corruption and impunity in Nepal have increased. Corruption is being gradually institutionalized; it is no more an issue of individual aberrations. The reasons for this deterioration, as reflected by global data, can be cited as follows:


- i. With the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly (CA) in May 2012, the political transition in Nepal has been protracted. During the transition period, there is a widespread feeling of uncertainty, instability, and insecurity. This in turn provided a breeding ground for corruption. Nepal may be one of the few countries in the world where the peace agreement contained an anti-corruption clause. Yet there is a lack of political will and commitment to fight corruption. “It is my turn now” attitude seems to have prevailed with every political change in Nepal. Literally, corruption by consensus has replaced the cliché for political consensus at the present context.
- ii. The decade long internal conflict considerably weakened the state administration. Moreover, the current state of impunity and lawlessness has further contributed to corruption. During the conflict, nearly half of VDC buildings were damaged or destroyed. This has considerably limited people’s access to the delivery of state services. The local bodies have remained without elected representatives since 2002. The increased flow of block grants to local bodies has been captured by local elites and users’ committees. There is also a situation of anomaly with regards to anti-corruption agencies. Nepal’s anti-corruption and oversight agencies are centralized while corruption is realized off being gradually decentralized at sub-national level.
- iii. Some newer forms of corruption like extortion, kidnappings, forced donations, and seizures of property have been passed on to the society as a part of internal conflict legacy. With easy access to small arms, and an unregulated open border with India, there is now a growing nexus between corruption and other crimes in Nepal.
- iv. The oversight agencies like CIAA, the Office of the Auditor General, Public Service Commission, Elections Commission and Public Accounts Committee have remained ineffective due to prolonged delay in the appointment of Chief Executives. This is also due to lack of sincerity and political will to fight corruption and establish a rule of law and good governance system.
- v. Gradually, the agenda of good governance and anti-corruption has been sidelined or pushed to take the back stage by more imperative agendas like peace building, federalism, holding of the CA elections, and drafting of the new constitution. This is exemplified by the adoption of compromised solutions.

- vi. The data on illicit financial flows by Global Financial Integrity shows illicit financial flows in Nepal average around \$805 million per year for the study period of 2002-2011. Nepal is ranked at 66th position among the list of 144 countries. This gives an indication of the amount of capital flight from the country.
- vii. Nepal's penal system seems to be too relaxed and outdated when dealing with corruption crimes. The punishment is not only too little and delivered too late; there is also an element of absurdity in allowing 20 per cent penalty waivers. The system has defied the concept of imposing harsh punishment to corruption convicts.

2. Role of CIAA in Countering Corruption

Since its establishment in 1990, the CIAA has passed through four distinct phases of operation. These three stages are depicted in the chart below. For more than a decade (1990/91-2000/01), CIAA remained inactive or dormant. The corruption complaints remained almost stagnant. The maximum number of cases filed by CIAA was 11 in 1996/97. The reason behind this situation is that the agency lacked the adequate power to investigate corruption crimes. It also had to spend considerable time lobbying for new anti-corruption laws. The power of the CIAA was also curtailed as it could not investigate ministers without having prior approval from the cabinet. There was some rejuvenation in 1996 when the Supreme Court restored the CIAA as the primary agency to fight corruption in the country. Earlier, there were confusions over the jurisdictions between the CIAA and the Special Police Department.

Figure 1: No. of corruption complaints at CIAA (1990/91-2012/13)



Data source: Table 2

The second phase (2001/02-2006/07) coincided with the appointment of the new Chief Commissioner. This phase is marked by a sharp rise and subsequent fall in CIAA activities. In 2002, the government enacted a new anti-corruption law which gave substantial investigative powers to CIAA. Immediately after the enactment of the new law, CIAA took dramatic actions against bureaucrats and political leaders. The actions brought increased public trust towards the agency and this is reflected by a sharp rise in corruption complaints at CIAA. The increased assertiveness by the CIAA also dragged it into a controversy related to issuing “clean chits” and accusations over partisan interests. With the establishment of Royal Commission for Corruption Control (RCCC) in February 2005, a clear setback can be observed in the CIAA activities. The six-year tenure of the Chief Commissioner came to an end in October 2006 resulting into yet another decline in the CIAA activities.

The third phase (2006/7-2012/13) is marked by a state of confusion and uncertainty inside the CIAA. Due to frequent changes in the government and due to lack of consensus among political parties, the government could not appoint the Chief Commissioner. The tenure of two remaining Commissioners also came close to retirement by January 2010. Thereafter, the CIAA had to function without proper leadership. However, amid this situation, one can see a marked rise in corruption complaints. This could be due to: (1) as described above, increase in corruption during political transition, (2) bold decisions taken by the Supreme Court, and (3) CIAA installing an on-line complaint registration system.

With the appointment of new leadership in May 2013, the CIAA is currently in its fourth stage. For the sake of convenience this stage can be termed as a phase of restarting. One can see a huge gap between corruption complaints received and resolved. This is due to recent increase in corruption complaints while the capacity of the CIAA has remained constant. In the absence of immediate effort to increase the capacity of the CIAA, it could easily run into organizational straining.

The quantitative growth in the CIAA activities masks the qualitative dimensions of its performance. The numbers of complaints have been increased but the credible complaints leading to detailed investigations amount to only 7 per cent. From 2004/5-2011/12, the conviction rate is 75 per cent. A large portion of this success comes from successful conviction rates related to cases of fake certificates. The average conviction rate for fake certificates is 92 per cent (refer to table 3) and three fourths of the cases filed by CIAA constitute cases related to fake certificates. In a majority of high profile cases, the conviction rate is very low. The analysis of six high-profile cases, including two under the review of the Supreme Court related to illicit enrichment (*akut sampati*) indicates that, on average, it takes more than nine years to settle a case in the court and the rate of recovery is around 38 per cent (refer to table 4 and 5).

With regards to the cases of improper conducts by the public servants, the CIAA does not fare well either. A study by INLOGOS (2006) assessing the effectiveness of departmental actions by CIAA indicated a total failure. The study revealed that (1) the departmental actions by the CIAA constituted only a small fraction of the total departmental actions in the civil service - a total of 183 over a period of seven years (2003-2007), (2) tardy decision making system - there were cases pending for as many as 13 years, and (3) a general reluctance on the part of government ministries to implement the CIAA's directives and suggestions. During the study period, the government implemented only 40 per cent of the departmental actions recommended by the CIAA.

The situation is even worse for the delegated authorities of the CIAA to the regional and district administrators. During the last eleven years (2001/2-2011/12), the average percentage of corruption complaints resolved by Regional Administrators is 33 per cent per year and for District Administrators is only 24 per cent per year. This is pretty low compared to 75 per cent resolution by the CIAA (refer to table 6). These figures indicate a total apathy on the part of bureaucrats at sub-national levels to take actions against their colleagues. The gravity of this situation has pushed the CIAA to establish regional and sub-regional offices in August 2013.

The table below presents a summary of findings from some of the past studies on the CIAA performance. The overall conclusions are not encouraging. It is surprising to see that even studies organized post 2002 do not reveal an encouraging picture.

Past Research Studies on the CIAA: Summary of Findings

SN	Title of the Study	Year	Institution	Major Conclusion/Findings
1.	Strategic Review of the Performance of the CIAA and OAG	1999	Pro-Public	People's perception of the CIAA is not positive; "has become a spider's web, which can catch insects but anything bigger escapes the snare"; "rich and powerful can almost never be convicted", "crippled by the politicians"; "previously the CIAA was like a toothless tiger but after the verdict of the Supreme Court in 1996, it has been given teeth, however it is now without a bite".

2.	Control of Corruption and the Role of the CIAA	2000	Transparency International	Number of prosecutions sharply declining, low conviction rate, delayed investigation process without results, non-transparent procedures. Besides weak and ineffective investigation and prosecution, the interpretation of the law by the court is also responsible for the legitimization of corruption in society.
3.	Need Assessment for Strengthening the CIAA	2001	Nepal Administrative Staff College/ DFID	Based on SWOT analysis, several recommendations were offered for improving the effectiveness of the CIAA. "It is highly imperative that it makes general people feel its existence and credibility, at least, by probing and exposing the cases of abuse of authorities at the higher echelons of the society."
4.	The CIAA Staff Training Needs Assessment	2005	Organization Development Centre	<p>The study identified two categories of training needs: (a) Training needs to be common to all divisions and (b) Specific training needs of different divisions.</p> <p>The first category includes: (1) Awareness and Orientation on legal issues, acts, rules, regulations and guidelines regarding corruption; (2) Communication skill; (3) Documentation and data-base management, (4) Computer skills; and (4) Office management. The second category includes: (1) Investigative tools and techniques; and (2) Techniques of case preparation and prosecution.</p>

5.	Institution Building for Controlling Corruption: A Case Study on the Effectiveness of the CIAA and NVC in Nepal	2007	IPRAD/SANEI	Based on the study of cases three years before and three years after the enactment of new anti-corruption law, the research study concludes that the CIAA is less effective because of non-supportive attitude of the courts.
6.	Study on Implementation and Effectiveness of Departmental Actions by the CIAA	2007	INLOGOS/ Pro-Public	Cases of Departmental Actions recommended by the CIAA are either pending or moving very slowly. There are cases pending from one month to 13 years. Out of a total of 183 recommendations for departmental actions by the CIAA in 1997-2003, only 40 percent of those recommendations were implemented by the government.
7.	Study on the Effectiveness of the CIAA Performance	2007	KFA/USAID	The study also includes a survey of 341 people seeking their views on the effectiveness of the CIAA. The study concludes that the CIAA is biased toward rich and powerful, 57 per cent responded that the CIAA is less effective, people expect the CIAA to combat policy level corruption by big and powerful people through own initiatives; suggested establishing an independent anti-corruption agency dealing with corruption in all sectors of the state.
8.	Political Intervention in the CIAA (yet to be published)	2013	TAF/Bhadra Sharma	Based on a number of corruption cases, the study seeks to explain how government has intervened in the workings of the CIAA. This has come primarily in two forms - by not appointing Chief Commissioner and interfering into the investigations of some high profile corruption cases.

Data source: Compilation from different sources

3. SWOT Analysis of the CIAA

We present here a SWOT analysis of the CIAA. The analysis is based on the presentations and feedbacks from a number of interactions and workshops of the CIAA officials and other stakeholders.

Strengths

- CIAA as the leading anti-corruption agency in Nepal,
- Adequate constitutional provisions and legal frameworks,
- Established organization with rich experience in investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes (the CIAA is the first agency to be established in the SAARC region),
- Clear jurisdiction, accountable to the parliament, annual reporting to the President; institutional independence with fixed tenure of the Chief Commissioner and other Commissioners,
- Clear organizational structure with recently established regional offices,
- Independent building and office infrastructure,
- Adequate human resources, including deputation of experts as and when necessary,
- Adequate financial resources, including incentives to the staff members,
- Code of Conduct and working procedures for the staff members
- New visionary leadership

Weaknesses

1. Legal weaknesses

- Limited mandate/jurisdiction; limited to the public sector corruption (corruptions in private sector and NGOs are outside the purview of the CIAA)
- The existing laws are not adequate to address emerging corruption issues,
- Weak witness protection,
- Insufficient punishment system,
- Procedural delays in case investigation,
- Weak enforcement of the CIAA decisions,

2. Economic weaknesses

- Insufficient resources,
- Lack of forensic lab for investigation, technicians and management information system,

3. Human Resource weaknesses

- Lack of skilled human resources, training and development opportunities,
- Problem of retaining skilled and experienced staff members (dependence on deputed staff members),
- Insufficient staff motivation and morale,
- Uneven workload distribution,

● **Opportunities**

- None can oppose to anti-corruption agenda,
- Ratification of the UNCAC by the government,
- Anti-corruption laws in Nepal are comparatively strong,
- There is greater public support – from media, civil society and general public,
- Growing international support and cooperation,
- Advances in modern technology,
- Establishment of regional offices,
- Plenty of opportunities to conduct research on corruption,

Threats

- Mismatch between public expectations and the CIAA jurisdiction (there is flood of public complaints; public expects immediate actions),
- Low level of public awareness against corruption,
- Lack of consistency in the adjudication process; non-predictability of court outcomes; cooperation and coordination problems between the CIAA and the court,
- Lack of will amongst politicians and the desire for unnecessary interferences,


- Institutionalization of corruption including deterioration in socio-cultural values, rise of unionism and syndicate system, weak political culture,
- Situation of political transition,
- Security threats to staff members and witnesses,
- Lack of institutional memory- weak database, weak monitoring and evaluation system and inadequate use of information technology (IT)
- Limited jurisdiction (army, judiciary, and cabinet is out of purview of the CIAA; the CIAA cannot take departmental actions, it can only recommend departmental actions)
- Crime and corruption is advancing far ahead of investigative and punitive measures; modern technologies are increasingly used to commit newer forms of crimes,
- There are problems related to recovery of stolen asset,

4. Stakeholder Analysis of the CIAA

Using UNDP instruments, the CIAA participants of the workshops and interactions were asked to rate five institutions that the CIAA has to work with most frequently now and in the future. The results of the participants' rating are graphed below.

- First, out of two dozen institutions, there are no institutions left out by the participants. This implies that the CIAA must deal with almost all of the listed institutions. In fact, the participants have added a few more institutions to the list. These include National Investigation Department, Land Revenue Department, Survey Department, and the Nepal Army.
- Second, the CIAA has to deal most frequently with two institutions, namely, the Police Department and the Office of the Attorney General. The Prime Minister's Office, Customs Department, Ministry of Finance, Procurement Agency and Office of the Auditor General are other institutions mentioned by the participants that the CIAA has to frequently interact with.

Figure 2: Stakeholders of CIAA- Present and Future



Data Source: Table 7

Third, participants have indicated the Chamber of Commerce as the top most institution that the CIAA will have to interact with most frequently in the future. This is an indication of expectation for the CIAA to fight corruption in the private sector as well.

5. Strategic Issues of the CIAA

Public opinions on the CIAA can be seen divided along two lines. The first view is that the CIAA, being the leading anti-corruption agency in Nepal, has remained ineffective. The usual accusations included: (a) it targets only “small fries” and fails to deal with “big fishes”, (b) there is a lack of transparency and impartiality in the CIAA actions; moreover, the actions are politically motivated, (c) there is a feeling of a “holier than thou” attitude within the CIAA, and (d) investigation, prosecution, and departmental actions are slow, and lack transparency and impartiality. This view is generally held by the public.

The second view is that the CIAA is becoming too assertive, particularly after 2002, and this has dampened the zeal and spirit of the Nepalese bureaucracy. With the watchful eyes of the CIAA, bureaucrats are no longer taking risks and are shifting responsibilities to the higher ups. This has led to further delays and sloth in the Nepalese bureaucracy. This view is generally held by people working within the

government and the politicians. Currently, the CIAA seems to be operating under these paradoxical situations. The truth must be found somewhere in between these two extremes. We summarize here some key strategies directly confronting the effectiveness of the CIAA's performance.

5.1 Mandate of the CIAA: *Want, Can and Must*

Constitutionally, the CIAA has been mandated to take actions against (1) corruption and (2) improper conduct by the public officials. The actions against corruption include detailed inquiries, investigations and prosecutions while actions against improper conduct include admonishment and recommendations for departmental actions. Constitutionally, the CIAA is a part of Nepal's law enforcement. However, in addition to these punitive/curative/deterrent measures, the CIAA undertakes preventive and promotional activities as well. Preventive measures include offering suggestions and advice to the government, issuing directives, preparing working procedure manuals and codes of conduct for public officials, and undertaking special reformatory studies. Similarly, promotional activities include public education and awareness generation activities, publication and distribution of pamphlets, stickers and newsletters, collaborating with civil society based anti-corruption organizations as well as with the media and the private sector. Given the fact that there are limited resources and a number of other agencies involved in fighting corruption, it is time for the CIAA to have a focused intervention. Instead of doing everything, the CIAA should reflect on "what it is supposed to do" and "what it is currently doing". Equally important is to understand what it *wants* to do, what it *can* do, and what it *must* do to fight corruption in Nepal. There is a need to strike a balance and prioritize between investigation and prosecution, prevention, and promotional activities. Resolving this question is also important as the CIAA has a limited jurisdiction. Corruptions in many sectors like army, judiciary, constitutional bodies, the private sector, and NGOs/INGOs are excluded from the purview of the CIAA. It is also time to rethink whether there should be a line of demarcation between investigation and prosecution. This debate has been triggered after CA members in the erstwhile dissolved parliament proposed in the draft constitution that the CIAA should only have investigative powers, with the Attorney General retaining the power to prosecute.

5.2 Stability vs. Flexibility

The second crucial point for the CIAA is to resolve the issue of stability vs. flexibility in its staffing. Whether the CIAA should have its own pool of staff members or have deputed staff members from the government and other agencies is a principle question. This debate has been recurring within the CIAA. Back in 1996/97, there were suggestions to have a separate pool of staff for

the CIAA. These were made in view of the fact that the CIAA work procedures are totally different from that of the government, and to avoid possible conflict of interest arising out of divided loyalties of staff members on secondment. With a cadre of permanent staff members, the CIAA can maintain a degree of stability and retain institutional memory. However, the downside of this system is that it loses flexibility in the acquisition and maintenance of diverse human resource. Corruption is a very complex problem requiring a multi-disciplinary approach. It is often difficult to predict and maintain the required skills and expertise for handling corruption problems. However, dependence on deputed staff members also has some downside effect. A staff on deputation may be transferred anytime by the government making the CIAA investigation vulnerable to the whims of the government. Prosecution works are one such example; currently, the CIAA depends on the pool of lawyers from the Attorney General. By having control over staff turnover, the CIAA can maintain some degree of institutional independence. Clearly, there is a need to strike a balance between maintaining stability vs. flexibility in human resource.

5.3 Incentives and Security of the Staff Members

Normally, staff members working within an anti-corruption agency are provided with an above market wage rate. Even practical considerations demand a different wage rate for people working within an anti-corruption agency like the CIAA. During adjudication process, often the lawyers hired by the defendants are highly paid professionals. This puts a low wage earning public servant in an inferior situation. Obviously, the big difference in wage level between defendant's lawyer and the government's lawyer affects on case hearing. There is a general accusation that the CIAA becomes active only before the filing of a case; and that it is the defendant who becomes active after the filing of the case in the court. This situation emphasizes the role of incentives in investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes. The level of incentives and how incentives are tied to staff performance has remained a moot question to be resolved within the CIAA. The incentive issue also includes factors like individual career development, training and development opportunities, and staff recognition. There is also the question of security for the staff and their family members, including immunity from possible backlashes for working with the CIAA. Adequate security to the witnesses and whistle-blowers is another issue that needs to be resolved.

5.4 Organizational Restructuring

Currently, the central structure of the CIAA is composed of six investigative divisions supported by four other divisions in prosecution: police, planning, case and administration division. The six investigative divisions have been formed

along the line of government line ministries. Other than an increase in the number of investigative divisions, the organizational structure of the CIAA has remained intact since it was approved in 2002. The existing structure provides little room for specialization in corruption investigation. Corruption is very much an area of specialization. Investigating corruption on public procurements requires totally different kinds of skills than investigating corruption in tax or land management, or the recovery of stolen assets; and the same applies with cybercrime. The CIAA is currently contemplating establishing an information and research wing which would be a much welcomed step in the right direction. The establishment of the CIAA regional outreach also demands a rethinking of allocation and configuration of work within the CIAA.

5.5 Capacity Development

Capacity development is another recurring issue within the CIAA. This includes issues like the CIAA having its own in-house training division, standard operating procedures, and work procedure manuals, management information system (MIS), a separate detention cell, and a forensic lab facility. There is also the question of balancing staff resources. Currently, almost 50 percent of the officerlevel staff members of the CIAA are from legal and administrative service backgrounds. There is a need to have a diversified workforce in terms of different skills and backgrounds. Again, all these depend on the availability of resources. Currently, the CIAA is totally dependent on the government for budget allocation. The budget allocated to the CIAA may have increased (from Rs. 2.8 million in 1991/92 to Rs. 135 million in 2011/12)but the increment is not on par with the increased work load. The independence of CIAA can only be protected through independence in resource mobilization. These resources can be both human and financial. Some kind of parameter needs to be worked out to ensure the financial independence of the CIAA. This could be either tying the CIAA performance with the national budget,say half a percent of national budget, or to its performance, such as some percentage from the recovery of assets or damages recovered from the convicts.

5.6 Institutional Coordination and International Linkages

On behalf of the Government of Nepal, the CIAA signed into the UNCAC in December 2003. As per the provisions made in the UNCAC, the role of the CIAA should have been at the centre of anti-corruption drive in Nepal. However, due to the political situation, UNCAC ratification was delayed for eight years. For a long period (2006-2013), CIAA remained without a leadership. Due to this situation, the responsibility to draft a National Anti-corruption Strategy (2009), Action Plans (2010), a National Anti-corruption Strategy, as well as an Action Plan to implement the UNCAC (2012) was taken up by the OPMCM. This gave an impression of

the CIAA functioning within the executive. The CIAA is very much an independent constitutional body. With new leadership intact, it is time that the CIAA takes a lead role in implementing, monitoring, and evaluating national anti-corruption strategies.

The proliferation of anti-corruption agencies (refer to Annex-3) has posed challenges to institutional coordination, avoiding overlap, and duplication of work. It is often found that a complainer may lodge complaints at the CIAA, NVC, RID, and DAMLI without informing all of the other institutions. This situation not only creates duplication of work, it also invites possible inter-agency conflicts. To avoid this situation, there is a need for close collaboration and coordination between anti-corruption agencies. For this the CIAA is an appropriate body to take a coordinating role.

Besides internal roles, the CIAA also has external responsibilities. These include building international linkages and collaboration. So far the CIAA has played a limited role to the extent of participating in ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative in Asia and the Pacific; and occasionally participates in some international workshops, seminars and conferences. It should be mentioned here that several international and multinational commitments need to be considered while drafting national anti-corruption strategy. These can be properly addressed through building international linkages and collaborations. External linkages also provide external legitimacy to the CIAA operations which is an asset in itself. With increased globalization, corruption problems are no longer limited to national boundaries; international cooperation, extradition, and mutual legal assistance (MLA) all call for external collaborations and cooperation. It should be remembered here that Nepal has been pushed to draft Anti-money Laundering Laws only after several threats of black listing were issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Such unpleasant incidences could have been avoided through better external linkages. There are immense possibilities for international linkages and institutional collaborations. These include having memberships with bodies like the International Anti-Corruption Association and International Anti-Corruption Academy. If possible the CIAA should enter into regional pacts with anti-corruption authorities.

5.7 Performance Measurement and Monitoring

Performance measurement is probably the weakest link in the CIAA's operations. The annual reports of the CIAA are replete with indicators of activities and, in some cases, outputs. The usual indicators included number of corruption complaints received and resolved, number of cases file, number of meetings held and

number of decisions made by the Commission. Efficiency indicators like cases handled, speed in resolving corruption complaints, or the cost of handling cases are virtually non-existent and unheard of within the CIAA. In some instances, some outcome indicators like conviction rates or assets recovered are given. But these indicators are not consistently reported over the period of time; nor is there information for comparison. In fact, the available indicators also mask the actual performance. For example, the CIAA speaks of high conviction rates; however, much of this rate comes from high conviction rates in fake certificates, blue books, and misuse of passports. Figure-3 exhibits how corruption complaints received by ACA can be disaggregated and decomposed for better understanding and management of corruption data. ICAC in Hong Kong disaggregates complaints data into efficiency indicators like (1) percentage of complaints responded within 48 hours, (2) percentage of incoming calls handled immediately, (3) number of complaints pursued within 12 months and (4) number of cases identified and investigated via. own initiative. Indicators like these are rare within the CIAA. Even with the available data, the CIAA can extract valuable information related to corruption problem in Nepal. What is required is considerable strengthening of the research and analysis wing within the CIAA.



Source: How to monitor and evaluate anti-corruption agencies: Guidelines for agencies, donors and evaluators, U4 briefing paper, Sept 11, Nr 8

Part B: CIAA's Institutional Strategy

Based on the review of the CIAA situation made in Part A, the Institutional Strategy of the CIAA is proposed here for next six years (2014-2019). In the National Strategy for implementing the provisions of UNCAC (2012), the government has made the CIAA responsible for organizing a three year evaluation of anti-corruption strategies and policies; it will be more relevant if we divide the six year strategy into two phases – Phase I and Phase II.

In the sections below, first the basic underlying assumptions and propositions behind combating corruption in Nepal are presented. This is followed by the required strategic moves within the CIAA proposed and then the vision, mission and goals of the CIAA are presented. Six broad ranges of strategies have been proposed for the CIAA to achieve the vision, mission and goals. The attached matrix elaborates on the proposed strategies to achieve vision, mission and goals of the CIAA for next six years (2014-2019).

1. General assumptions and propositions

- Corruption can only be reduced; it cannot be eliminated.
- There is no one-size-fit-all anti-corruption strategy and policy; each country has to tailor its anti-corruption strategies and policies.
- Anti-corruption drives are a long term process; there are no short cuts in anti-corruption campaigns. “It is a marathon, not a sprint”.
- The chances of success are greater when anti-corruption strategies are focused toward particular sector, level, or function of economic activity.
- Anti-corruption movement can hardly be successful in the absence of public support.
- There is a need as well as an opportunity for broad international linkages, cooperation and collaboration to fight against corruption.

2. More Assumptions related to Nepal’s Anti-Corruption Drive

- Political will to fight corruption in Nepal is weak.
- The general environment of the country, i.e., political transition, is less conducive to fighting corruption.
- There is a need for the CIAA to build its public image and re-assert itself as a leading anti-corruption agency in Nepal.

- CIAA's effectiveness has been constrained by deficiencies in existing anti-corruption laws, regulations and institutions. The mandate of the CIAA needs to be broadened to fight corruption.
- Corruption is a multi-faceted problem requiring cooperation and collaboration from multiple agencies, both inside and outside the government. It would be totally wrong to believe that the CIAA alone can or will solve the corruption problems in Nepal. However, the CIAA has a distinct role to play in combating corruption.

3. Need to Dovetail with Existing Anti-Corruption Strategies and Policies

The Institutional Strategy of the CIAA has to be guided by anti-corruption strategies, objectives and action plans of the Government of Nepal and the provisions made in UNCAC. The basic guiding documents include:

- The Anti-Corruption Strategy outlined in the Concept Paper of the 13th National Development Plan (2070/71-2072/73) by the National Planning Commission (NPC),
- National Strategy and Action Plan to Implement UNCAC 2012,
- Strategy and Action Plan against Corruption produced by the Government of Nepal in 2008 and Institution-wise Action Plan 2010,
- Other national and international commitments made by the Government of Nepal,

4. Strategic Moves for CIAA


The table below depicts some required strategic shifts in the operation of the CIAA.

From	To
• Emphasis on symptoms	• Corruption as a disease; needs to diagnose its root causes
• Punitive, sanctions	• Prevention and deterrence
• Corruption as a legal problem	• Corruption is very much an administrative or economic problem
• Individualist orientation; killing the temptation of the individuals	• System orientation, reforming methods and system; reducing the opportunities for corruption

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focusing on petty corruption; domestic corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Grand corruption, state capture; cross border corruption (money laundering as an example)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reactive institution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proactive institution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rumors and hearsay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence-based data
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fighting corruption for the sake of fighting corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reform in the public sector, emphasize on good governance agenda like transparency, accountability, integrity and public participation.

5. Proposed Vision, Mission and Goal

The chart below depicts the proposed vision, mission, goal, and strategies of the CIAA.



Vision: To help build corruption-free Nepal

Success Indicators

The vision of the CIAA will contribute towards building a society that is largely free of corruption. Since there are other state and non-state agencies engaged in combating corruption, the role of the CIAA should be to help contributing in these endeavors. An array of governance indicators is available to measure good governance and anti-corruption. Some of these indicators, with baseline figures, are presented here to measure possible achievement of the vision. Though some countries in Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea) have fixed target values to measure the success of implementing anti-corruption strategies, at this stage, it will be too difficult for the CIAA alone to determine target values. Therefore, we suggest that the CIAA keep an eye on changes in these indicators as a measure of its successes or failures.

S.No	Possible Indicators and maximum score	Baseline values	2014-2016	2016-2019	Data Source
1.	Corruption Perception Index (100)	31 (2013)			Transparency International
2.	Control of Corruption (100)	23.4 (2012)			The World Bank
3.	Doing Business Index (global ranking)	105 th (2014)			The World Bank
4.	Global Competitiveness Index* (7)	3.66 (2013-14)			World Economic Forum
5.	Rule of Law Index (simple average of the eight variables)* (1.00)	.498 (2012-2013)			World Justice Project
6.	World Happiness Index* (10)	4.156 (2010-12)			UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network

*Corruption constitutes one variable in the composite measure.

Mission Statement:

Establishment of good governance and rule of law through combating corruption and improper conduct in the public sector

Success Indicators

The Interim Constitution, 2007 has mandated the CIAA to fight corruption and improper conduct only in the public sector. The Government of Nepal is considering expanding the jurisdiction of the CIAA to include corruption in the private sector and non-governmental organizations. In case the jurisdiction of the CIAA is expanded, we may need to edit the phrase “in the public sector” to accommodate the new situation.

In addition to above global measures, the following indicators will be used to measure the progress on mission statement. Similar to vision statement, there

are no fixed target indicators to be achieved but these indicators will be used to monitor the progress of this strategy implementation.

S. No	Possible Indicators and maximum score	Baseline values	2014-2016	2016-1019	Data Source
1.	Increase in government revenue	Rs. 289 bil. (2011-12)			Economic Survey Report, MoF
2.	Decrease in government leakages	Rs. 204 billion (068-69 B.S.)			Annual Audit Report, OAG
3.	Increase in FDI	Rs. 714 mil (2011-12)			Economic Survey, MoF
4.	Decrease in capital flights	Average Illicit Financial Flows \$805 mil (2002-2012)			Global Financial Integrity Reports

Goal:

By 2019, there will be perceptible reduction in corruption and improper conduct in the government.

Success Indicators

Two sets of data will be used to monitor the CIAA progression on goal achievement. First is the data coming from the Global Corruption Barometer Survey organized by Transparency International. The survey takes place on a biannual basis. So far Nepal has been listed twice - in 2010/11 and 2013. It is not sure whether Nepal will be listed in the forthcoming surveys. Hopefully it will be included. In case Nepal is being included, some leading questions from GCB survey will be used to monitor progress on the achievement of the goal statement. Second, a host of in-house indicators will be developed and used to measure the progress. A list of these indicators is provided below -

S. No.	Possible Indicators and maximum score	Baseline values	2014-2016	2016-1019	Data Source
1.	Percentage reporting corruption to have increased in GCB Survey	72% reported corruption increased in last two years (2013)			Global Corruption Barometer Survey, <i>Transparency International</i>
2.	Percentage reporting ineffectiveness of the government to fight corruption.	67% reported the government to be ineffective in fighting corruption (2013)			Global Corruption Barometer Survey, <i>Transparency International</i>
3.	Increase in the CIAA conviction rate (excluding fake certificates)	87% (2011-12)			CIAA data
4.	Increase in money recovered	Rs.123.16 mil. (2011-12)			CIAA data
5.	Increase in the implementation of departmental actions	40% (Inlogos study)			CIAA data
6.	Speed of Investigation*				CIAA data
7.	Speed of Prosecution*				the CIAA data
8.	Increase in public image of the CIAA.	Base line data to be determined after survey			Survey works

*Baseline information has to be collected from the CIAA.

6. Proposed Institutional Strategies for the CIAA

Six broad institutional strategies are proposed here for the CIAA. Three of them are core strategies. These core strategies follow three basic functions of anti-corruption agencies, namely, corruption prevention, awareness generation, and education and punitive actions (3Ps). Three core strategies will be supported by

three additional strategies. These include capacity development, coordinating of anti-corruption agencies, and building international linkages and collaboration.

The strategy plan matrix outlines further details on sub-strategies, issues and challenges, objectives of the strategies, activities to be pursued within each strategy/sub-strategy, indicators to measure the success of the strategy implementation, time dimension of the strategy and the agency within the CIAA responsible to implement the strategy. Currently, UNDP assistance is underway to support the CIAA's capacity development project. The proposed three years UNDP capacity development strategy is expected to cover much of the needed action plans to implement this institutional strategy.

Core Strategies: 3Ps

The CIAA will pursue three core strategies, namely, punitive, preventive, and promotional (3Ps) activities. However, over a period of time, the CIAA will maintain a judicious mix between these three core strategies. In view of the limited resources and the engagement of other anti-corruption agencies, the priority focus of the CIAA will be on punitive measures. This flows from the idea conceived in the Constitution that the CIAA is primarily an anti-corruption law enforcement agency. This is not to say that the CIAA will not engage in preventive and promotional activities. As entrusted by the constitution, anti-corruption law enforcement will be the core part of the CIAA activity. Prevention of corruption and promotional activities will complement and supplement anti-corruption law enforcement function.

During the first phase of operation (2014-2016), the CIAA activities will concentrate on punitive side of anti-corruption. Sub-strategies to be followed under this head include:

- Reforming existing anti-corruption laws (This is also in line with the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan 2012 to implement UNCAC. Out of 30 listed activities related to reforming existing laws, GoN has listed the CIAA as responsible for 23 activities),
- Improving complaint handling system,
- Improving case management system,
- Proactive anti-corruption law enforcement mechanism (surveillance, intelligence, detection and undercover/sting operations),
- Coordination with other anti-corruption law enforcement agencies,
- Anti-Corruption Policy Research and Analysis,

With regard to preventive strategy, activities of the CIAA will be limited to:

- Identification of corruption prone zones, including major cause of corruption in the system,
- Policy recommendations and suggestions to the government to prevent corruption,
- Monitoring and evaluation of anti-corruption activities carried out by different anti-corruption agencies,

Similarly, with regard to promotional activities, the activities of the CIAA will be limited to:

- Cultivating political will to fight corruption,
- Supporting civil society based good governance and anti-corruption organizations in their effort to promote good governance and anti-corruption promotion and education works,

Supporting Strategies

Three supporting strategies are recommended. These strategies include:

- Capacity development of the CIAA,
- Coordination and collaboration with anti-corruption agencies, oversight agencies, and CSOs,
- Building International Linkages,

Among these three strategies, capacity development strategies should be the priority concern of the CIAA. There are a number of capacity development issues ranging from human resource development to organizational restructuring to financial management to performance monitoring and evaluation. Compared to capacity development activities, institutional collaboration and building international linkages do not entail that much of time, effort and resources.

Detailed information related to above strategies have been presented in a matrix below:

S.No.	Institutional Strategies and Sub-strategies	Issues and Challenges	Strategic Objectives	Success Indicators	Time
					Phase I (2014-2016) Phase II (2017-2019)
A. Core Strategies					
1	1.1 Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws 1.2 Reforming anti-corruption laws 1.3 Improving complaint-handling system including <i>tameli</i> system 1.4 Improved case-management system 1.5 Installing proactive anti-corruption law enforcement mechanism (surveillance, intelligence, detection, sting operations) 1.6 Coordinating with other anti-corruption law enforcement agencies (like RID, AMLD, Public Procurement Monitoring Office, Foreign Employment Tribunal, NID and Nepal Police) 1.7 Anti-corruption policy research and analysis	Key concept: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “<i>Big bang approach</i>”– <i>winning the minds and hearts of the people.</i> • Limited mandate of the CIAA • Delays in case investigation, prosecution and adjudication process while people expect quick actions • Absence of laws on the protection of informants and whistleblower • Approval of PSC required to implement Departmental Actions • Archaic anti-corruption laws (e.g., provision for 25 percent penalty waiver for voluntary acceptance of the court verdict by the convicts) • CIAA occupied with petty corruption cases like fake academic certificates, blue books, and passports (>80% of cases) • Low conviction rate for high profile cases on illicit enrichment (18% compared to 95% for fake certificates) • Shift from “fire-fighting” mode to systematic prevention of corruption. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To enforce of anti-corruption laws effectively through having effective anti-corruption laws, improving identification, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption crimes. • To have focused, prioritized, high-profile, high-impact anti-corruption works. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in conviction rates, especially, of high-profile corruption cases (number of cases, number of people convicted by their status, amount involved) • Increase in money recovered from the convicts • Reduction in number of days required to investigate a case • Increase in percentage of cases prosecuted to cases investigated • Increase in number of complaints settled, response time to settle complaints (say within 48 hours) • Increase in number of complaints made in genuine name vs. fake name, through different channels (online, fax, emails, telephones, personal visits) • Increase in percentage of Departmental Actions implemented by the government. <p>Corruption Law Enforcement Index may be designed for CIAA that captures most of the above indicators. The index comprises of five factors:</p> <p>(a) Per cent settlement of corruption complaints, (b) Per cent preliminary investigation becoming detailed investigation (c) Per cent detail investigations becoming prosecution, (d) Per cent conviction rate and (e) Per cent execution rate. The respective weightage are 10%, 20%, 30% 50% and 100%)</p>	The activities to be covered within Phase I and carried out in Phase II

2	<p>Corruption Prevention</p> <p>2.1 Identification of corruption prone zones; including identification of causes of corruption in the system.</p> <p>2.2 Policy recommendations and suggestions to the government on corruption prevention.</p> <p>2.3 Monitoring and evaluation of corruption prevention works undertaken by different anti-corruption agencies.</p>	<p>Key concept: "Prevention is better than cure."</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A number of agencies are already engaged in the prevention of corruption-these range from executive agencies like NVC to NGOs like local chapters of Transparency International. • There is a need to avoid overlapping and duplication in the activities performed by different agencies. • Corruption prevention is very much a part of administrative reform process. • It is a long drawn out process involving multiple stakeholders. • The CIAA can only suggest preventive policy measures; implementation rests with the line agencies. • The preventive role of the CIAA should be confined to the extent of deterrence of corruption through enforcement of anti-corruption laws plus policy recommendations arising out of law enforcement. 	<p>To systematically coordinate and monitor corruption prevention works.</p> <p>To identify corruption prone zones and offer recommendations and suggestions to government to preempt corruption</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase in number of suggestions and recommendations made to the government on key issues and their implementation status • increase in number of policy studies/research on corruption prevention • Increase in the number of coordination and monitoring meetings on corruption prevention; including participation and response from corruption prevention agencies. 	<p>Strategies 2.1 and 2.2 to be implemented in Phase I, in case of time constraints, Strategy 2.3 and 2.4 can be deferred to Phase II.</p>
3	<p>Public Awareness and Education</p> <p>3.1 Cultivating political will and commitment to fight corruption</p> <p>3.2 Spreading anti-corruption awareness programs among top-level civil servants, local body representatives and public enterprise management.</p>	<p>Key concept: Public support is the foundation of anti-corruption drive.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a need to enhance and sustain political will and commitment to fight corruption, including securing independence of the CIAA • General apprehensions and reservations of political leaders on the CIAA need to be dispelled. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To enhance political will and commitment to fight corruption • To help support public awareness and education programs by various anti-corruption agencies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased resource allocation to fight corruption • Number of interaction programs with political parties and their leaders. • Improvement in Global Corruption Barometer Survey reporting and national and local level Corruption Perception surveys • Increase in corruption reporting; media coverage of corruption 	<p>Strategies 3.1 and 3.2 to be carried out in Phase I</p>

	<p>3.3 Help support civil society based anti-corruption and good governance organizations in their effort to promote anti-corruption education and publicity works.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The activities related to public awareness and education should best be left with the civil society organizations, media and academic organizations. • The role of CIAA should be confined to policy directives and coordination. 			
B. Supporting Strategies					
4.	<p>Capacity Development of the CIAA</p> <p>4.1 Human Resource Development of the CIAA</p> <p>4.2 Forensic Lab and detention centers</p> <p>4.3 Management Information System (MIS)</p> <p>4.4 Office infrastructure-office space, vehicles</p> <p>4.5 CIAA Organizational restructuring</p> <p>4.6 Institutional Performance Monitoring and Evaluation</p> <p>4.7 CIAA Financial Management</p> <p>4.8 Institutional Strategy Implementation & Monitoring</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The issue whether the CIAA should have its own cadre of staff members or continue relying on deputed staff members has been pending for a long a time. This complex issue needs to be resolved in view of (1) staff retention and turnover, (2) staff motivation level, (3) institutional memory; (4) installing unbiased and fearless investigation and prosecution system and (5) training and development opportunities • The current organizational structure of CIAA allows little room for specialization in anti-corruption activities. • CIAA has recently decentralized its operations by establishing five regional offices and is contemplating the establishment of sub-regional offices. New decentralized operation demands for coordination and control mechanism. • In order to gain public legitimacy and support the CIAA needs to develop credible system of performance measures. Performance effectiveness is also a key to ward off political interference. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To build the CIAA as a leading anti-corruption agency in Nepal • To build CIAA as a specialized anti-corruption agency. • To build a cadre of highly capable, honest, trained, and dedicated staff members to fight corruption. • To maintain financial independence of CIAA. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low staff turnover, high retention rate, • Increased public trustworthiness on CIAA staff members skills profile • Availability of job description • Even work load distribution • Increased staff morale and motivation • Physical facilities and infrastructure • Increased resource mobilization 	<p>Strategies 4.1, 4.3, 4.5 and 4.6 to be implemented in Phase-I and remaining activities to be carried out in Phase-II</p>

5	<p>Coordination and Collaboration</p> <p>5.1 Implementing the provisions related to UNCAC ratification</p> <p>5.2 Liaise with anti-corruption nodal centers in Government Ministries and Departments</p> <p>5.3 Partnership with Private Sector</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Anti-Corruption National Strategies and Action Plan (2010) and National Strategies and Action Plan to implement UNCAC (2012) • In the past, due to the absence of CIAA leadership, there has been limited institutional collaborations and coordination • In the future, CIAA is expected to move to private sector or supply side of corruption. Therefore, there is a need to build partnership with the private sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To support the implementations of UNCAC provisions • To coordinate all the activities related to anti-corruption in Nepal • To collaborate with civil society based anti-corruption organizations & private sector. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of UNCAC provisions implemented • Number of events organized with the civil society organizations, private sector and media • Pacts with the private sector 	To be implemented in Phase I and Phase II
6	<p>Building International Linkages</p> <p>6.1 Membership/accreditation with international anti-corruption agencies like IAAC, IACA, RIACS, ADB/OECD, UNDP, UNODC, Transparency International, etc.</p> <p>6.2 Participating in international forums, workshops, and meetings</p> <p>6.3 Hosting regional and international conferences and meetings.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International linkages help to boost image of the CIAA and gain international legitimacy and support for its work. • Increased international support and linkages expected to (1) transfer of knowhow and skills, (2) opportunities for exposure and training, (3) technical and financial assistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To help building international image of CIAA to develop continuous international linkages and collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Membership in International bodies and Associations • Participation in International Fora and Meetings; • Hosting a number of Regional and International Conferences 	To be implemented in Phase-I and Phase- II

7. Final Remarks and Conclusions

The CIAA is an anti-corruption law enforcement agency. This should be the primary and immediate concern of the CIAA. Therefore, a priority of the CIAA will be to implement strategy for the enforcement of anti-corruption laws. The other two functions, namely, preventive and promotional functions will complement and supplement the law enforcement strategy. While implementing law enforcement strategy, the CIAA will focus on:

- High-profile corruption cases involving big shots or big payoffs
- As a part of law enforcement, the provision of 20 per cent penalty waiver (as it is already the antiquated system) will be revised,
- Over a longer period of time, CIAA will relieve handling the cases of fake certificates to an appropriate agency within the executive,
- A definite policy on investigating past corruption crimes needs to be chalked out so that the CIAA is not swamped by past corruption cases.
- All complaints lodged at the CIAA will be investigated and responded on time. The reason why a complaint has been put into tameli will be informed to the complainer if the whereabouts of the complainer is known. This is to ensure impartiality of the CIAA in picking and choosing corruption cases for investigation.
- The CIAA will improve its skills on corruption surveillance; detection, and investigation and for this purpose, it will deploy selective sting/under-cover operations.

The main objective behind the above strategy is to regain and restore public trust and confidence of the CIAA being the leading anti-corruption agency in Nepal. Once public trust and confidence is gained through effective law enforcement, the CIAA then will move on to preventive and promotional activities.

- Preventive and promotional functions will invariably be of medium and long term concern of the CIAA. They will be of immediate concern to the CIAA only when they have high value impacts. An example will be the CIAA engaging in creating “political will and commitment” to fight corruption.
- The CIAA will effectively dispense general biasness, apprehensions, and distrust that exist among some political party leaders.
- Clearly, a strategy to develop the CIAA as a law enforcement agency will be matched with the stock of existing human resource of the CIAA. The CIAA will exhibit itself as an organization of high integrity. This

calls for enough pay and facilities as far as possible, tied up with work performance, strict adherence to staff code of conduct, immunity from possible retaliatory actions for working with the CIAA, and opportunities for career development. The CIAA will undertake a human resource audit; develop a strategy for human resource management to resolve the issue of stability vs. flexibility. Continuous upgrading of skills through training and development will be the key to human resource development.

- Another key area of strategic intervention is the mobilization of financial resources. Much of the CIAA's operational freedom comes from financial independence. In addition to government subsidies, the CIAA will strive to mobilize additional resources; this could form percentage shares of assets recovered. In this regard, the CIAA very much welcomes any support from bilateral and multilateral agencies.
- Research and data analysis will extensively backup the CIAA law enforcement function. The CIAA will organize research works in identifying key corruption prone areas in Nepal and, accordingly, focus and prioritize its interventions. This calls for the CIAA to have a pool of experts in economics, finance, and banking, research and data analysis, computer software, administration, law etc.
- The current Investigation Division will be reorganized to give room for specialization of corruption investigation like Procurement Corruption, Infrastructure Corruption, Political Financing, Cyber Crime, and Service Delivery Corruption. This is expected to provide a room for specialization in the CIAA investigation works. The CIAA will undertake organizational restructuring works.
- The CIAA will be developed as a performance based organization. This calls for introducing well-designed performance measurement yardsticks encompassing inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts for each staff member, units, divisions, and the CIAA as a whole. In the absence of well-designed measurement systems, it is nearly impossible to expect a performance based culture.

- Henceforth, the CIAA will assume a lead role in reviewing, redrafting national anti-corruption strategies and policies in line with UNCAC provisions. This calls for increased coordination, collaboration, and cooperation with various anti-corruption agencies both inside and outside Nepal. It should be noted here that the CIAA can assume preventive functions only when all anti-corruption agencies in operating in Nepal collaborate together as a unified force.
- At a time when corruption problem is increasingly globalized, the CIAA will build necessary international linkages, networks, and collaborations. This is expected to provide external legitimacy to the operations of the CIAA.

In conclusion, the primary aim of this strategy is to ensure the accomplishment of our goals through effective performance and to have a sustained and good public image and trust of the Commission ultimately.

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Perception of Corruption in Nepal

Year	CPI (1)	CoC (2)	GCB Survey (3)	GII (4)
1996	-	60.5	-	-
1998	-	37.6	-	-
2000	-	33.2	-	-
2002	-	44.9	-	-
2003	-	45.9	-	-
2004	2.8	22.0	-	-
2005	2.5	32.2	-	-
2006	2.5	30.2	-	50
2007	2.5	25.2	-	60
2008	2.7	26.2	-	64
2009	2.3	28.7	-	67
2010	2.2	30.0	-	-
2011	2.2	23.7	62.8%	-
2012	2.7	23.4	-	-
2013	3.1	-	72.0%	-

Note:

- 1) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranges from 10 (cleanest) to 0 (highly corrupt).
- 2) Control of Corruption (CoC) from 0-100. In both cases, higher scores imply better situation.
- 3) Percentage responding “corruption to have increased a lot in past three years” (two years in 2013 survey).
- 4) Global Integrity Index (GII) measures the availability of anti-corruption safeguards in the country. Higher score represents better situation.

Table 2: the CIAA Statistics

Year	Complaints Lodged	Complaints Resolved	Number of Prosecutions	Departmental Actions	Number of abolishment, suggestions and recommendations	Total Staffing	Total Budget (Rs. in mil.)
1990/91	564	-	-	-	-	-	-
1991/92	1069	581	1	-	11	44	2.8
1992/93	1050	618	5	5	9	-	4.1
1993/94	1020	526	6	10	9	74	4.5
1994/95	1003	636	1	2	18	72	5.4
1995/96	1085	711	2	8	15	94	6.1
1996/97	1501	750	22	12	21	94	7.1
1997/98	1606	920	6	19	46	85	8.8
1998/99	1313	861	12	10	33	99	8.9
1999/00	859	498	5	12	21	100	9.7
2000/01	1261	698	26	12	30	105	8.6
2001/02	2522	2015	61	18	83	147	21
2002/03	3966	2481	147	25	39	215	28
2003/04	3732	3188	98	38	47	289	39
2004/05	4759	3709	113	39	56	312	86
2005/06	4324	3353	114	45	38	267	156
2006/07	3564	2976	115	29	32	275	91
2007/08	2732	2135	65	28	45	282	84
2008/09	4149	3303	47	29	144	279	91
2009/10	4295	3067	32	12	100	276	94
2010/11	6145	3904	65	5	33	276	108
2011/12	8839	5466	123	14	49	290	135
2012/13	11289	6672	93	80	204	-	-

Source: the CIAA Annual Reports

Table 3: the CIAA Conviction Rates (2004/05-2011/12)

Year	General Conviction Rate (%)	Percentage of Cases related to fake certificates	Conviction rate success in fake certificates
2004/5	92.00	85.00	94.00
2005/6	82.00	60.00	94.80
2006/7	81.87	80.86	95.25
2007/8	74.80	83.07	94.70
2008/9	67.40	72.00	94.34
2009/10	52.90	70.40	89.63
2010/11	62.71	68.66	88.33
2011/12	88.14	77.48	88.48

Table 4: A Sample of the CIAA High Profile Cases

S. No.	Corruption Case	Settlement Duration (Years)	Original Charge (Rs. in mil.)	Final Conviction (Rs. in mil.)	Final Conviction (%)
1.	Mr. Chiranjibi Wagle	11	33.0	20.3	61.52
2.	Mr. Ramagya Chaturbedi	9	77.1	13.9	18.02
3.	Mr. J.P. Gupta	10	20.8	8.41	40.43
4.	Mr. Moti Lal Bohara (under review at SC)	8	23.8	2.68	11.26
5.	Mr. Govinda Raj Joshi (under review at SC)	9	39.4	21.6	54.82
6.	Mr. Khum Bahadur Khadka	9	23.7	9.47	39.96
	Average	9.33	36.3	12.73	37.67

Table 5: Average Amount Claimed per Case filed by the CIAA (2004/5-2011/12)

Year	Number of Cases filed by CIAA	Amount Claimed by CIAA (Rs. in Mil.)	Average amount per case (Rs. in Mil.)
2004/5	113	1708.12	15.12
2005/6	114	605.07	5.31
2006/7	115	46.86	0.41
2007/8	65	24.51	0.38
2008/9	47	232.85	4.95
2009/10	32	17.38	0.54
2010/11	65	396.18	6.10
2011/12	123	123.16	1.00

Table 6: Corruption Complaints at Regional and District Administration (2001/2-2011/12)

Year	Regional Level				District Level			
	Number of Complaints	Number of cases Resolved	Balance	Resolved (%)	Number of Complaints	Number of cases Resolved	Balance	Resolved (%)
2001/02	-	-	-	-	1644	455	1189	27.68
2002/03	221	26	195	11.76	1398	319	1079	22.82
2003/04	364	74	290	20.33	1448	431	1017	29.77
2004/05	399	128	271	32.08	1687	375	1312	22.23
2005/06	391	112	279	28.64	2312	649	1663	28.07
2006/07	338	36	302	10.65	1596	219	1377	13.72
2007/08	333	291	42	87.3	1568	272	1296	17.35
2008/09	102	58	44	56.86	1565	238	1327	15.21
2009/10	102	23	79	22.55	1504	465	1039	30.92
2010/11	172	39	133	22.67	1473	388	1085	26.34
2011/12	323	101	222	31.26	1843	636	1207	34.50
Average				32.54				24.42

Table 7: Stakeholders of the CIAA

S. No.	CIAA Stakeholders	Institutions with whom the CIAA works most frequently (1)	Institutions with whom the CIAA has limited or no work relations but where improved relations would be useful (2)
1.	Police Department	28	4
2.	Attorney General	27	5
3.	Prime Minister's Office	18	12
4.	Custom Administration	16	4
5.	Ministry of Finance	16	5
6.	Procurement Agency	15	10
7.	Supreme Court	11	8
8.	Auditor General	11	10
9.	Ministry of Health	11	2
10.	Financial Intelligence Unit	10	9
11.	Parliament	10	9
12.	Ministry of Education	9	4
13.	Ministry of Economic Affairs	8	3
14.	Tax Administration	7	10

15.	Office of the Attorney General	6	3
16.	Civil Service Training Institute	5	6
17.	Ministry of Internal Affairs	5	5
18.	President's Office	4	4
19.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2	7
20.	Public Service Commission	2	8
21.	Police Academy	2	11
22.	Chamber of Commerce	2	27
23.	Employers' Association	1	10
24.	Central Authority for Mutual Legal Assistance	1	14
25.	Some additional suggested institutions	Special Court	National Investigation Dept. Land Revenue dept., Survey dept., Nepal Army

Data source: Ratings by the workshop participants, N=38

Table 8: District wise Registration of Corruption Complaints (1998-2011)

S. No	District	2011	2010	2009	2008	2007	2006	2005	2004	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	1998	Total
1	Bara	44	21	33	87	22	38	65	46		67	20	18	19		480
2	Dhanusa	33	20	17	25	33	33	38	63	38	48	4	25	44	24	445
3	Saptari	30	75	74	50	13	17	63	30		60	6	6	10	4	438
4	Lalitpur		7	15	12		83	280	16		8					421
5	Mohattari	45	10	11	1	3	3	109	131	4	14	3	11	9	7	361
6	Parsa	15	29	8	10		18	55	77	14	32	10	10	2	4	284
7	Siraha	18	14	66				71	13	16	17	16	30	20	3	284
8	Rupandehi	27	29	26	14	6	16	22	17	21	32	14	23	19	5	271
9	Sarlahi	85	6		1	3		36	39	17	46	15	2	7		257
10	Kathmandu	41	53	1		14	4	43	16	2	57					231
11	Morang	63				6		15	35	11	37	11	7	28		213
12	Banke	15	9	8	4	10	18	38	39	32	25		7	1	3	209
13	Humla	3				6		7			31		4		128	179
14	Chitawan	24	4	7	18	8	2	11	32	14	13	5	13	3	5	159
15	Rauthahat	8	36		3				30	15	21	8	14	18	3	156
16	Rukkum	14	13	12	21	3		81	5					1	1	151
17	Udaypur	24	26	3	1	4	3	47	10	3			2	2	9	134
18	Achham	64	21	4	4	7		3	13				1	1		118

19	Bardia	20	17	5	9	8	3	6	2		33	4	3	4	3	117
20	Sunsari	28	13	7	7				3	7	31	8	9	4		117
21	Jhapa	1	15				5	13	21	2	16		15	10	17	115
22	Gulmi	18			1			16	1	6	11	14		11	20	98
23	Salyan		6	1	1			16	18	8	4	15	13	5		87
24	Nawalparasi	6	4	3	4	2	3	2	3		5	12	11	19	5	79
25	Sankhuwasaba	4	17	8	7	2		2	3	1	4	9	12	9		78
26	Dang		1	15		2	4	3	13	11	19			1	1	70
27	Dolakha	5	6	3	3	13	20		4	6	1	1	2	3	3	70
28	Surkhet	24	5	2		5	2	2	5		10	3	2	4	4	68
29	Illam	9	15	7				3	3		9	7	2	5	4	64
30	Kapilbastu	22	7	6	2	3	1	15	3			4			1	64
31	Kaski	1	3	2	10	5	3	28			3	4	2		1	62
32	Bhaktapur	4	9	5	1	2		6	14	12	7					60
33	Ramechhap	23	6	2		2	1	2	4	9	1		6	1	1	58
34	Kanchanpur	9	5	3	4	5	5		9	13	4					57
35	Kavrepalanchowk	9	2	1					3	3	8	3	2	6	12	49
36	Baitadi	4	20	2	2	2		6	1		7	1	1	1		47
37	Sindhuli	20	10							6				3	6	45
38	Nuwakot	11	9	5	3	1					4			11		44
39	Dhankuta	6	5		4	4				2	4	2	4	6	3	40
40	Jajakot	19	10	1		3	2		3				2			40
41	Bajura	10	5	1	3	5					6	3	2	3	1	39
42	Lamjung	22	2				2	4		4	4				1	39
43	Kailali	21							1	1	8	1	1	3	1	37
44	Kalikot		1	2	8	3	12		2		4	2	1	2		37
45	Prabat	8		10	1		1	4		1	3	1	5	1	2	37
46	Therthum					2		6	4		9	1	8	1	2	33
47	Doti	6	6	5		1		2	2	4	5	1				32
48	Sindhupalchok		4	1	3			2			3	7	3		9	32
49	Baglung				1	4		4	8		9	1	4			31
50	Dailekh		2		1	2		1	6	2	6		8	2	1	31
51	Rasuwa	4	4	4	5	1	1				5	1		4		29
52	Khotang	11	4		2					3	6			2		28
53	Panchthar	3			7							3	11		4	28
54	Argakhanchi	3	5	3	6	6					2				2	27
55	Dhading		1	2	6	2		10	4					2		27
56	Gorkha		2	2			2				8	8	2	2		26
57	Myagdi						2	13	4		3	1	1			24

58	Plapa	1	7	3					2			5	6			24
59	Darchula	5	5	4			1	2	4					1	1	23
60	Jumla	8				2		5	2				3	3		23
61	Mugu	2				1	4					3		12	1	23
62	Solukhumbu	2	7	3					3	2	1		4	1		23
63	Syanjha		1	5		1		3		1	11			1		23
64	Tanahu		1					7	7		7			1		23
65	Dolpa		4					4					2	3	2	15
66	Dhadheldhura	1			2	1		2	1		2	1	1		3	14
67	Taplejung	5			1			2	1		1	2	2			14
68	Bhojpur	1			2			3				1	1	3	2	13
69	Makwanpur	3	1	1	1			2	1				1	1	1	12
70	Okhaldhunga				2	1	4							4		11
71	Rolpa	1			2			2	1		2					8
72	Bajhang	3	1	1						1						6
73	Mustang	2					2						1			5
74	Pyuthan			2									2	1		5
75	Manang		1									1				2

Annex: 1

List of State-Level Anti-Corruption Agencies in Nepal

S. No.	Anti-Corruption Agencies	Type	Major Focus
1.	Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA)	Constitutional body	Investigation and prosecution of cases of corruption and improper conduct
2.	National Vigilance Centre (NVC)	Prime Minister's Office	Awareness raising and corruption prevention
3.	Supreme Court	Judiciary	Adjudication of corruption cases
4.	Special Court	Judiciary	Review of Special Court verdicts
5.	Office of the Attorney General	Constitutional	Public prosecutor
6.	Judicial Council	Constitutional	Combating corruption in judiciary
7.	Revenue Investigation Department	Ministry of Finance	Detection of revenue leakage
8.	Independent Review Committee	Committee under Public Procurement Act	Corruption related to public procurement over Rs30 million.
9.	Central Arrears Collection Office	Financial Comptroller/ Ministry of Finance	Collection of government dues and arrears
10.	Parliamentary Committees (Public Accounts Committee and State Affairs Committee)	Parliament	Parliament oversight agencies
11.	Office of the Auditor General	Constitutional	Auditing of books of accounts
12.	Offices of the Regional Administrators and Chief District Officers	Ministry of Home	Handling regional and district-level corruption cases remaining within the authorities delegated by the CIAA
13.	Office of the Financial Comptroller	Ministry of Finance	Government budgetary control
14.	Foreign Employment Tribunal	Judiciary	Adjudicate corruption in overseas employment business
15.	Financial Information Unit	Nepal Rastra Bank (The Central Bank)	Information on money laundering and financial crimes
16.	Department of Anti-Money Laundering and Investigation	Ministry of Finance/DRI	Investigating the cases of money laundering

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